The Nakamoto longest chain protocol has served Bitcoin well in its decade long existence. It is remarkably simple and uses only basic cryptographic primitives, but its proof-of-work framework is energy wasting. Proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols are an energy efficient alternative; however they are significantly complicated and promise weaker security guarantees. An effort to mimic the Nakamoto protocol directly in the PoS setting is made in [10] with security shown only for a class of purely private attacks. In this paper we demonstrate a new, and fatal, attack on the protocol of [10] . This attack motivates the design of a new family of Nakamoto-style longest chain PoS protocols, with a formal proof of their security against all possible attacks in a general security model.
Introduction
Bitcoin is the original blockchain, invented by Nakamoto. The core of the protocol is a permissionless consensus problem, which is solved by Nakamoto via the longest chain protocol [17] . The protocol is remarkably simple and uses only basic cryptographic primitives (hash functions and digital signatures). The permissionless design (robustness to Sybil attacks) of Bitcoin is achieved via a proof-of-work (PoW) mining process, but comes at the cost of large energy consumption.
Recently proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols have emerged as an energy-efficient alternative. There are broadly two families of PoS protocols: those derived from decades of research in Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols and those derived inspirationally from the Nakamoto longest chain protocol. Attempts at blockchain design via the BFT approach include Algorand [7, 12] and Hotstuff [18] . The adaptation of these new protocols into blockchains is an active area of research and engineering [4, 12] , with large scale permissionless deployment as yet untested.
Motivated and inspired by the time-tested Nakamoto longest chain protocol are the PoS designs of Snowwhite [6] and the Ouroboros family of protocols [1, 2, 8, 14] . Both Snowwhite and the Ouroboros family are significantly more involved than the simple Nakamoto longest chain protocol -this is because the inherent energy efficiency of the PoS setting also enhances the space of adversarial actions and the corresponding design of secure protocols gets more involved. A direct and clean mimicry of the Nakamoto protocol in the PoS setting is first attempted in [10] , where a family of PoS protocols called g-greedy is proposed. The authors conduct an informal analysis of their protocols in the context of a specific attack -a Nakamoto-style private attack -and claim security as long as enough fraction of participants follow protocol. The key issue they focused on is the nothing-at-stake problem in PoS protocols: unlike in PoW protocols where work is conserved, nodes can propose for free on all the blocks in the block tree. This effect is exploited by the adversary to grow a faster private chain than it could otherwise by proposing only on the longest chain. The g-greedy protocol is an attempt to increase the growth rate of the honest chain to counteract the power of the adversary: instead of proposing only on the longest chain, honest nodes propose on all chains which are no more than g blocks shorter than the longest chain. This provides an amplification of the growth rate of the longest chain.
In this paper ( §2) we show that the security analysis of the g-greedy protocols of [10] even within the context of the private nothing-at-stake attack is flawed; we provide a corrected analysis. More importantly, we demonstrate a new public-private balance attack on the g-greedy protocols that strictly dominate the private attack in terms of probability of deconfirmation being larger for every k-deep confirmation rule in the g-greedy protocols. Our analysis shows that the balance attack is fatal to g-greedy protocols; for instance for g = 6 even with only a 3% stake, the adversarial action has more than 25% probability of deconfirmation even if the honest players are using a very conservative 100-deep confirmation rule.
This security breach of the g-greedy protocol of [10] opens up two directions of core interest: is there another way to mimic the simplicity of Nakamoto longest chain protocol in PoS settings? Can a formal security analysis under a large class of adversarial actions be successfully conducted? These are the goals of this paper, where we show the following.
a new family of simple longest chain PoS protocols that we call Nakamoto-PoS ( §3); the fork choice rule remains the longest chain but the randomness update in the blockchain is controlled by a parameter c; we provide a formal analysis ( §6) of the c-Nakamoto-PoS protocol under a general security model ( §4).
This nuanced analysis shows that the nothing-at-stake attacks are no deterrent to the security of the c-Nakamoto PoS protocols as long as the adversarial stake is small enough.
Intuitively, the parameter c controls how frequently randomness is updated as the blocktree grows: randomness is updated once every c levels. The randomness is used to elect a leader on each block. Increasing c reduces the amount of independent randomness across blocks and reduces the power of nothing-at-stake attacks. We should point out that the Ouroboros family of protocols [1, 8] achieves security also by an infrequent update of the randomness; however, the update is much slower than what we are considering here, at the rate of once every constant multiple of k, the security parameter. Here, we are considering c to be a fixed parameter independent of k, and show that this is sufficient to thwart the nothing-at-stake attacks.
We guarantee the security of c-Nakamoto-PoS under the formal model we define in §4. Following [7] , we use Verifiable Random Functions (VRF) to make proposer elections unpredictable by an adversary. This prevents the adversary from preemptively corrupting the proposers. Following [7, 8] , we use Key Evolving Signature (KES) schemes to ensure the contents of past blocks cannot be altered. Together, these advanced cryptographic primitives enhance security of our protocol.
2 Attack on the g-greedy Protocol of [10] g-greedy Protocol. A straightforward PoS adoption of Nakamoto protocol runs as follows. Each node runs one leader election at each time slot with a winning probability proportional to its stake. Concretely, a hash function H is called to generate a pseudo random number hash based on three sources of randomness: the time, the node's secrete key, and the hash of the parent block that the newly generated block will be appended to: hash = H(time, secret key, parentBk.hash). The node n is elected a leader if hash is smaller than a threshold ρ × stake n , that is proportional to its stake stake n . Following Nakamoto's protocol, each honest node runs only one election, appending to the last block in the longest chain in its local view. When there is a tie, the node has a freedom to select one block to mine on. This poses an opportunity for an adversary to attack, by grinding on the hash of the parent block; an adversary can run multiple leader elections in a single slot, mining on different blocks. As no significant computational resources is required, this is called the Nothing-at-Stake (NaS) attack. In particular, this allows the adversary to rapidly grow a private block tree (which we refer to as a private NaS tree) and take over the honest chain. It was shown in [10] that this attack is successful if the adversary controls more than 1/(1 + e) fraction of the total stake, where e is the base of the natural logarithm.
In an attempt to increase this threshold closer to 1/2, [10] proposes a family of protocols called g-greedy, parameterized by a non-negative integer g. Under the g-greedy protocol, the honest nodes are prescribed to run multiple leader elections in an attempt to outgrow the private NaS tree. In an honest node's view, if the longest chain is at height blocks, then the node mines on any block that is higher than − g blocks (illustrated by the blocks inside the dotted box in Figure 1 ). When g = ∞, each honest node works on every block, and when g = 0, the node works on all blocks at the same height as the tip of the longest chain in the current view. Note that 0-greedy differs from Nakamoto's protocol, which chooses one block to mine on when there are multiple longest chains. Private Attack on g-greedy Protocol. A notorious attack in longest chain blockchain protocols is the private attack: the adversary privately mines a chain that is longer than the longest chain in the honest view. Roughly speaking, by the law of large numbers, adversary will fail with the private attack eventually if the growth rate of the adversarial chain is strictly lower than the honest chain. The security guarantee for g-greedy protocol in [10] is based on this argument. Without loss of generality, suppose there is a single adversarial node with stake β and honest nodes together command a stake of 1 − β. This means that every mining attempt by the adversary succeeds with probability β. In the private attack, the adversary employs NaS to grow its tree, by mining simultaneously on all nodes, cf. Figure 2 for "before-after" snapshots when the adversary employs this attack. The growth rate of this NaS tree is found by recursively describing the average number of nodes, x (t) at level at time t: dx dt = βx −1 (t) for ≥ 1 with the boundary condition given by x 0 (t) = 1 (corresponding to the genesis block). These differential equations admit a closed form solution: x (t) = (βt) ! . The expected growth rate of the NaS tree is then the largest R NAS such that = R NAS t and x (t) decreases exponentially in t. A direct calculation shows that R NAS = eβ, where e is the base of the natural logarithm (see Appendix A.1 for a detailed proof). The authors of [10] calculate the growth rate of the NAS tree in an analogous manner (using difference equations). How about the expected growth rate R g of the honest tree under the g-greedy protocol and private behavior by the adversary? It is clear that R g is monotonically increasing in g. The limiting largest expected growth rate is achieved at g = ∞, where the protocol is the same as the NaS attack. Thus the expected growth rate R g = (1 − β)e for g = ∞. One suspects that the protocol for g = 0 is similar to simply growing Table 1 : Expected growth rate of honest tree Rg for g-greedy protocol under private adversarial behavior. The largest adversarial stake that can be tolerated under the private attack is denoted by βg. The claims of [10] are corrected and compared with our calculations.
only one of the longest chains. If the mining rate is slow enough (mining is considered to occur in discrete rounds which are spaced enough apart relative to the network broadcast propagation delay; detailed model in §4), then the expected growth rate of the honest tree (essentially a chain) is simply 1 − β. This is the expected growth rate of the honest tree with g = 0.
The expected growth rate for a general g is significantly involved. In Lemma 4.6 of [10] , a heuristic argument is conducted to estimate the expected growth rate for g = 2 to be R 2 = 2.1(1 − β). This heuristic argument can be extended to other values of g (see Appendix A.2) as summarized in Table 4 . We note that R 8 = 2.7414(1−β), which is at odds with the observation that R g increases monotonically and R ∞ = e(1−β). This shows that the heuristic argument in Lemma 4.6 of [10] is flawed. It is clear that the expected growth rate is related to the solution to the following set of recursive differential equations:
A closed form solution to R g is challenging; although a numerical solution is readily achieved and tabulated in Table 1 .
We can make the following conclusion from Table 1 : the g-greedy protocol of [10] is robust to the purely private NaS attack as long as the adversarial stake is such that R g > R NaS = eβ. As g grows large, this threshold on the adversarial stake approaches 1 2 ; for instance, for g = 5, robustness to private NaS attack is achieved as long as the adversarial stake is less than 47.86%. The caveat is that this security statement is misleading since only one specific attack (the private NaS attack) has been studied. A different attack strategy could prove more malignant, as we show next. Balance Attack on g-greedy Protocol. We describe an adversarial action that is a combination of private and public behaviors below; we term this as a balance attack for reasons that will become obvious shortly; this attack has some commonalities with the balance attack on the GHOST protocol in [15] . The key idea of the balance attack is to reveal some privately mined blocks at an appropriate time to balance the length of two longest chains each sharing a common ancestor in the distant past.
The balance attack aims to have two longest chains of equally long length, forking all the way from the genesis block. Figure 3 depicts the balance attack in action, as it progresses over time. At any time, the adversary will try to mine on every block including public blocks and private blocks, while honest nodes follow g-greedy protocol. Once the adversary succeeds in creating a new block, it will first keep the block in private as shown in step 1 and step 3 of Figure 3 . Whenever the adversary owns a private chain that has the same length as the longest public chain, it will reveal the private chain so that there will be two public chain with the same length as shown in step 2 and step 4 of Figure 3 . If the adversary can keep up this kind of balance attack, then it has successfully prevented any block from irreversible no matter how deep the block is buried in the longest chain. To succeed with the balance attack, the adversary only needs to mine a few blocks as most blocks in the two main chain may be mined by honest nodes under g-greedy protocol. A formal pseudocode describing the balance attack algorithm is available in Appendix A.3.
The balance attack is hard to analyze theoretically, but its efficacy can be evaluated via simulations. The depth of the longest fork and its associated cumulative probability is plotted in Figure 4 for fixed parameters g, β. We see that in each instance, the probability of a fork of any length is larger for the balance attack than the private NaS attack; this implies that the balance attack stochastically dominates the private attack. For example, when g = 2, β = 0.38, the adversary is able to cause a fork from genesis, which is longer than 100 blocks, with a probability around 20%, while the private attack can only achieve it with probability less than 0.1%. In this instance, the balance attack is significantly more powerful than the private attack. The goal of the adversary is to balance the lengths of two chains each tracing the genesis block as their ancestor, consequently creating a deep fork. Fig. 4 : Comparison of CDF of the longest fork from genesis caused by private attack and balance attack for various pairs of (g, β). The balance attack is a stochastically dominating strategy for g ≥ 1.
We see that virulence of the balance attack increases, dramatically, with g. In Figure 5 , the blue lines plot the largest value of β the balance attacking adversary can have while allowing a fork of a large fixed length (50,100,200 blocks) with significantly high probability (25%, 25%, 10% respectively). The orange line plots the corresponding largest value of β using the private NaS attack. The experiments conclusively demonstrate the fatal nature of the balance attack as g increases: the private NaS attack gets weaker while the balance attack gets dramatically stronger. For g = 6, the balance attack is successful in creating a very long fork (200 blocks deep) with a high probability (10%) using only 3% of the stake. Conclusion. We can conclude two lessons from this section. First, the simple conversion of Nakamoto protocol to PoS as espoused in [10] is vulnerable -thus the question of a simple Nakamoto longest chain protocol for PoS is an open problem. Second, it is important to conduct a mathematically complete and thorough analysis of the security under a formal model covering a wide class of adversarial actions -thus any new proposal has to be subject to the high bar of formal security analysis. The results in the rest of the paper are inspired by these two lessons: we present a new extension of the Nakamoto protocol to PoS in §3 and its security analysis in §6 under a security model described in §4.
Nakamoto-PoS Protocol Sketch
The attempt to mimic Nakamoto protocol in PoS by [10] is not secure (as demonstrated in §2); however the protocol with g = 0 is still a very natural extension. We notice that while the balance attack was demonstrably stronger than the private attack for all g ≥ 1, it was not as effective for the special case of g = 0. It is possible that the g-greedy protocol is secure for g = 0 and that β g = 1 1+e is the true threshold of largest adversarial stake that can be tolerated. This remains an open question.
In this section we show that a subtle modification to the 0-greedy protocol of [10] can indeed be proved to be secure under a formal security model. The 0-greedy protocol of [10] prescribes honest nodes to grow on all the longest chains of the block tree. In our subtly modified protocol we only grow on one of the longest chains (the chain which was seen the earliest); this is directly following the Nakamoto protocol where the mining process is conducted on only one of the leaves of the longest chains in the block tree. For this protocol, that we call Nakamoto-PoS, we show security in a standard security model ( §4) as long as the adversarial stake is no more than 1 1+2e ( §6). Although our suggested change to the basic 0-greedy protocol appears subtle, this change plays a currently indispensable mathematical role in the security proofs in §6. When the honest nodes mine on multiple longest chains simultaneously, honest blocks can contribute to growing multiple chains. The adversary only needs to make sure that those chains are balanced as in the balance attack.
It remains open whether the 0-greedy protocol of [10] is secure and whether the true threshold of adversarial stake for security is 1 1+e (currently our mathematical techniques need the more conservative threshold of 1 1+2e ); these questions appear to be of significant mathematical depth and constitute an active research problem but outside the scope of this paper.
[10] generalized the basic 0-greedy protocol by changing the fork-choice rule (leading to the family of g-greedy protocols), but as we have seen in §2, this direction is inherently insecure. Instead, we generalize our basic Nakamoto-PoS protocol differently: we retain the fork choice rule, but change the update of the randomness used in mining. We describe this next, starting from first principles, starting with the Nakamoto longest chain rule. A leader election (mining process) uses a general hash function of the form: hash = H(header). One option is to use header = (time, secret key, parentBk.hash). Including time ensures there is one leader election per time slot. The secret key links the hash to the owner of the stake. Including parentBk.hash provides an unpredictable source of common randomness, which ensures that the outcome of the election can not be predicted in advance. However, this allows the adversary to grind on the parentBk.hash, appending to all blocks in the block tree. This grinding attack is the same as the NaS attack and the growth rate of the private tree grown by an adversary is amplified by a factor of e (Appendix A.1).
In order to mitigate this grinding attack, we propose a principled approach by changing the source of randomness in mining: we call our scheme as c-correlated-Nakaomoto-PoS. Let height of a block b be the number of blocks in the chain between the genesis and b (including b but not the genesis). The height of the genesis block is zero. Instead of updating the source of randomness at every block with parentBk.hash, we only update it at blocks of height multiples of c. An example with c = 5 is shown in Figure 6 . The genesis block is initiated with a bit sequence to be used as a source of randomness denoted by a red triangle. All of its descendant blocks inherit the same bit sequence as a source of randomness, until it reaches height c = 5. This ensures that for blocks at height less than c, even the adversarial blocks can only run one election at a time slot with the header (time, secret key, ).
Note that the content of the block is added after the leader election. Hence, the adversary can make multiple versions of the new block with the same header, but carrying different transactions and even appending to different parent blocks (as long as the parent block has a common source of randomness . An example is shown for two blocks with the header (time=4,secret key=A, ).
When the block chain reaches a height multiple of c, for example five in the figure, the block updates its source of randomness with the hash of the parent block. This gives an opportunity for the adversary to create multiple blocks at height five and grind on those multiple sources of randomness. This correlation parameter c gives the system designer the control to gracefully interpolate between full grinding attack with figure) , transactions, and the RandomSource of the block to be used in the next election. This random source is preserved from parent to children blocks, until one mines a block at height that is a multiple of c. In such a case, new RandomSource is drawn using the hash of the current header and the secret key of the miner.
amplification factor e (when c = 1) and no grinding attack with amplification factor of one (when c = ∞). One downside of having a large c is that it allows each node to predict further into the future when it will be elected a leader. This opens new doors for attacks such as bribing, which is outside the security model studied in this paper. We discuss such external security threats in Section 7. Permissionless PoS. One major advantage of the Nakamoto protocol in the proof of work setting is its permissionless setting: anyone can join (leave) the system by simply contributing (extricating) computing power for the mining process. Under the PoS setting the stakes are used in lieu of the computing power. To support a protocol that is close to a permissionless system, we need to handle the case when the stake is dynamically varying. Unlike the case of compute power, the entry/removal of stake has to be more carefully orchestrated: if a change in the stake takes effect immediately after the transaction has been included in the blockchain, then this gives an opportunity for the adversary to grind on the secret key of the header (time, secret key, common source of randomness). Concretely, once an adversary has generated a block, it can add a transaction that moves all its stake to a new coin with a new pair of public and secret keys. The adversary can keep drawing a new coin and simulating the next leader election, until it finds one that wins. This is a serious concern as the adversary can potentially win all elections.
To prevent such a grinding on the coin, we use s-truncation introduced in [1, 10]. s-truncation has two components: delay in stake update and fork choice rule. The stake changes due to transaction added to blockchain takes effect after s time slots. However, this allows an adversary to launch a long range attack, for any value of s < ∞. To launch a long range attack, an adversary grows a private block tree. Once it has grown for longer than s time slots, then it can grind on the coin to win the election at time s + 1, and add the favorable transaction to the ancestor block at time 1. As all blocks in this private tree are adversarial, the consistency of the transactions can be maintained by re-signing all intermediate blocks. This allows the adversary to win all elections after s time slots, and eventually take over the honest block chain.
To prevent this long range attack, we propose a variation of Nakamoto's longest chain rule, that we call s-truncation. When presented with a chain that forks from current longest chain, a node compares the two chains according to the following rule. Both chains are truncated up to s time slots after the forking. Whichever truncated chain has more blocks (and hence longer) is chosen to be mined on. This ensures that honest block chains will be chosen over privately grown adversarial chains with long range attacks. A detailed description of the c-correlation, s-truncation, Nakamoto-PoS protocol is in §5.
Security Model
A blockchain protocol Π is directed by an environment Z(1 κ ), where κ is the security parameter. This environment (i) initiates a set of participating nodes N ; (ii) manages nodes through an adversary A which corrupts a dynamically changing subset of nodes; (iii) manages all accesses of each node from/to the environment including broadcasting and receiving messages of blocks and transactions.
The protocol Π proceeds in discrete time units called slots, each consisting of δ milliseconds (also called the slot duration), i.e. the time argument in calling the hash function should be in δ millisecond increments. A ledger associates at most one block to each slot among those generated (or proposed) by participating nodes, each running a distributed protocol. Collectively, at most one block per slot is selected to be included in the ledger according to a rule prescribed in the protocol Π. Similar to [14] , we assume that every user has access to the current global time and network delays do not exceed the slot duration.
We follow the security model of [11] with an ideal functionality F. This includes diffuse functionality and key and transaction functionality as described below. With a protocol Π, adversary A, environment Z, and security parameter κ, we denote by VIEW n,F Π,A,Z (κ) the view of a node n ∈ N who has access to an ideal functionality F.
We consider a synchronous, round-based network model similar to that of [8, 11, 14] that accounts for adversarially controlled message delivery and immediate node corruption. All broadcast messages are delivered by the adversary, which is synchronized in rounds. Each round is ∆ milliseconds (also called the round duration), and we allow the adversary to selectively delay messages sent by honest nodes, with the following restrictions: (i) the messages broadcast in the previous round must be delivered by the beginning of the current round; and (ii) the adversary cannot forge or alter any message sent by an honest node. This is a synchronous version of the so called delayed diffuse functionality (denoted by DDiffuse ∆ in [8, 14] ).
The dynamically changing set of honest (or uncorrupted) nodes H ⊆ N strictly follows the blockchain protocol Π. The key registration functionality (from [14] ) is initialized with the nodes N and their respective stakes (stake 1 , . . . , stake |N | ) such that the fraction of the initial stake owned by node n is stake n / m∈N stake m . At the beginning of each round, the adversary can dynamically corrupt any node n ∈ N , with a permission from the environment Z in the form of a message (Corrupt, n). For the honest nodes, the functionality can sample a new public/secret key pair for each node and record them. For the corrupted nodes, if it is missing a public key, the adversary can set the node's public-key, and the public keys of corrupt nodes will be marked as such.
Any of the following actions are allowed to take place. (i) A node can retrieve its public/secret key pair from the functionality. (ii) A node can retrieve the whole database of public keys from the functionality. (iii) The environment can send a message (Create) to spawn a new node, whose local view only contains the genesis block, and the functionality samples its public/secret key pair. (iv) The environment can request a transaction, specifying its recipient. The functionality adjusts the stakes according to the transactions that make into the current ledger, as prescribed by the protocol Π. The adversary has access to the state of a corrupt node n, and will be activated in place of node n with restrictions imposed by F. When the adversary releases the control of a corrupt node, the node retrieves the current view of the honest nodes at the beginning of the following round. Verifiable Random Function (VRF). Verifiable Random Functions (VRF), first introduced in [16] , generates a pseudorandom number with a proof of its correctness. A node with a secret key sk can call VRFprove(·, sk) to generates a pseudorandom output F sk (·) along with a proof π sk (·). Other nodes that have the proof and the corresponding public key pk can check that the output has been generated by VRF, by calling VRFverify(·, output, π sk (·), pk). An efficient implementation of VRF was introduced in [9] , which formally satisfy Definition 7 in Appendix C. This ensures that the output of a VRF is computationally indistinguishable from a random number even if the public key pk and the function VRFprove is revealed. Key Evolving Signature schemes (KES). We propose using forward secure signature schemes [5] to sign the transactions to be included in a generated block. This prevents the adversary from altering the transactions in the blocks mined in the past. Efficient Key Evolving Signature (KES) schemes have been proposed in [8, 13] where keys are periodically erased and generated, while the new key is linked to the previous one. This is assumed to be available to the nodes via the ideal functionality F. This ensures immutability of the contents of the blocks.
Protocol description
We explain our protocol following terminologies from [8] and emphasize the difference where it applies. The ideal functionality F captures the resources available to the nodes in order to securely execute the protocol. When a PoS system is launched, a collection N of nodes are initialized. Each node n ∈ N is initialized with a coin possessing stake stake n , a verification/signing key pair (KES.vk n , KES.sk n ), and a public/secret key pair (VRF.pk n , VRF.sk n ). The Key Evolving Signature key pair (KES) is used to sign and verify the content of a block, while the Verifiable Random Function key pair (VRF) is used to verify and elect leader nodes who generate new blocks. All the nodes and the adversary know all public keys {pk n = (KES.vk n , VRF.pk n )} n∈N . The genesis block contains all public keys and initial stakes of all nodes, {(pk n , stake n )} n∈N , and also contains a nonce in genesis.content.RandSource. This nonce is used as a seed for the randomness. The height of a block in a chain is counted from the genesis (which is at height zero). We denote the time at the inception of the genesis block as zero (milliseconds), such that the i-th slot starts at the time δ · i milliseconds (since the inception of the genesis block). Nakamoto-PoS protocol is executed by the nodes and is assumed to run indefinitely. Our security analysis applies when the total running time is polynomial in the security parameter κ. At each slot a node starts with a local chain C, which it tries to append new blocks on.
Proposer selection. At each slot, a fresh subset of nodes are randomly elected to be the leaders, who have the right to generate new blocks. To be elected one of the leaders, each node first decides on where to append the next block, in its local view of the blocktree. This choice of a parent block is governed by the fork choice rule prescribed in the protocol. For example, in BitCoin, an honest node appends a new block to the highest node in the local view of the blocktree. This is known as Nakamoto protocol. We propose s-truncated longest chain rule that includes the Nakamoto protocol as a special case, which we define later in this section.
A random number of leaders are elected in a single slot, and the collective average block generation rate is controlled by a global parameter ρ that is adaptively set by the ideal functionality F. The individual block generation rate is proportional to the node's stake. The stakes are updated continuously as the ledger is updated, but only a coin in the ledger s time slots earlier can be used in the election (the same parameter s as used in the truncated longest chain rule), and is formally defined later in this section.
Concretely, at each slot, a node n ∈ N draws a number distributed uniformly at random in a predefined range. If this is less than the product of its stake and a parameter ρ (Algorithm 1 line 15), the node is elected one of the leaders of the slot and gains the right to generate a new block. Ideally, we want to simulate such a random trial while ensuring that the outcome (i) is verifiable by any node after the block generation; (ii) is unpredictable by any node other than node n before the generated block has been broadcast; and (iii) is independent of any other events. Verifiability in (i) is critical in ensuring consistency among untrusted pool of nodes. Without unpredictability in (ii), the adversary can easily take over the blockchain by adaptively corrupting the future leaders. Without independence in (iii), a corrupt node might be able to grind on the events that the simulator (and hence the outcome of the election) depends on, until it finds one that favors its chances of generating future blocks. Properties (ii) and (iii) are challenges unique to PoS systems, as predicting and grinding attacks are computationally costly in PoW systems.
To implement such a simulator in a distributed manner among mutually untrusting nodes, [8, 12] proposed using Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs), formally defined in Appendix C. In our proposed protocol, a node n uses its secret key VRF.sk to generate a pseudorandom hash and a proof of correctness (Algorithm 1 line 14). If node n is elected a leader and broadcasts a new block, other nodes can verify the correctness with the corresponding public key VRF.pk and the proof (which is included in the block content). This ensures unpredictability, as only node n has access to its secret key, and verifiability, as any node can access all public keys and verify that the correctness of the random leader election.
The pseudorandom hash generated by VRFprove(x, VRF.sk), depends on the external source of randomness, (x, VRF.sk), that is fed into the function. Along with the secret key VRF.sk, which we refer to as the private source of randomness, we prescribe constructing a header x that contains the time (in a multiple of δ milliseconds) and a dynamically changing common source of randomness. Including the time ensures that the hash is drawn exactly once every slot. Including the common source of randomness ensures that the random elections cannot be predicted in advance, even by the owner of the secret key. Such private predictability by the owner of the secret key leads to other security concerns that we discuss in Section 7.
A vanilla implementation of such a protocol might (a) update stakes immediately and (b) use the hash of the previous block (i.e. the parent of the newly generated block in the main chain as defined by the fork chain rule) as the common source of randomness. Each of these choices creates a distinct opportunity for an adversary to grind on, that could result in serious security breaches. We explain the potential threats in the following and propose how to update the randomness and the stake, respectively, to prevent each of the grinding attacks. A formal analysis of the resulting protocol is provided in Section 6.
Updating the common source of randomness. One way to ensure unpredictability by even the owner of the secret key is to draw randomness from the dynamically evolving blocktree. For example, we could use the hash of the parent block (i.e. the block that a newly generated block will be appended to). This hash depends only on the parent block proposer's secret key, the time, and the source of randomness included in the header of the parent block. In particular, this hash does not depend on the content of the parent block, to prevent an additional source of grinding attack. However, such a frequent update of the source creates an opportunity for the adversary to grind on. At every round, a corrupt node can run as many leader elections as the number of blocks in the blocktree, each appending to a different block as its parent. To mitigate such grinding attack, we propose a new update rule for the source of randomness which we call c-correlation.
A parameter c ∈ Z determines how frequently we update. The common source of randomness remains the same for c blocks, and is updated only when the current block to be generated is at a height that is a multiple of c (Algorithm 1 line 17). When updating, the hash of that newly appended block is used as the source of randomness. When c = 1, this recovers the vanilla update rule, where a grinding attack is most effective. We can increase c to gracefully increase the security threshold. A formal analysis is provided in Section 6. When c = ∞, every block uses the nonce at the genesis block as the common source of randomness. This makes the entire future leader elections predictable in private, by the owners of the secret keys.
Dynamic stake. The stake of a node n (or equivalently that of the coin the node possesses) is not only changing over time as transactions are added to the blocktree, but also over which chain we are referring to in the blocktree. Different chains in the tree contain different sequences of transactions, leading to different stake allocations. One needs to specify which chain we are referring to, when we access the stake of a node. Such accesses are managed by the ideal functionality F (Algorithm 1 line 10).
When running a random election to append a block to a parent block b in the blocktree, a coin can be used for this election at time t if and only if the coin is in the stake at time t − s on the chain leading to block b. Accordingly, a node n has a winning probability proportional to stake n,b (t) when mining on block b at time t, where stake n,b (t) denotes the stake belonging to node n at time t − s. Starting from an initial stake n (0) = stake n,genesis (0), we add to or subtract from the stake according to all transactions that (i) involve node n (or the coin that belongs to node n); (ii) are included in the chain of blocks from the genesis to the reference block b; and (iii) is included in the block chain at least s slots before t. Here, s ∈ Z is a global parameter.
When s=1, the adversary can grind on (the secret key VRF.sk of) the coin. For example, once a corrupt node is elected as a leader at slot i, it can include transactions at slot i to transfer all stake to a coin that has a higher chance of winning the election at slot i + 1. To prevent such a grinding on the coin, a natural attempt is to use the stake at slot t − s. However, there remains still a vulnerability, if we use the Nakamoto protocol (also known as the longest chain rule) from BitCoin as the fork choice rule.
Consider a corrupt node growing its own private chain from the genesis block (or any block in the blocktree). A private chain is a blockchain that the corrupt node grows privately without broadcasting it to the network until it is certain that it can take over the public blocktree. Under the Nakamoto protocol, this happens when the private chain is longer (in the number of blocks) than the longest chain in the public blocktree. Note that the public blocktree grows at a rate proportional to ρ and the total stake of the nodes that append to the public blocktree. With a grinding attack, the private chain, which is entirely composed of the blocks generated by the corrupt node, can eventually take over the public blocktree.
Initially, the private chain grows at a rate proportional to ρ and the stake controlled by the corrupt node. However, after s slots from the launch of the private chain, the corrupt node can start grinding on the private key of the coin; once a favorable coin is found, it can transfer the stake to the favored coin by including transactions in the block s slots earlier in the private chain. This is possible as all blocks in the private chain belong to the corrupt node. It can alter any content of the private chain and sign all blocks again. With such a grinding attack (which we refer to as coin grinding), the corrupt node can potentially be elected a leader every slot in the private chain, eventually overtaking the public blocktree. To prevent this private grinding attack, we propose using an s-truncation as the fork choice rule.
Fork choice rule. An honest node follows a fork choice rule prescribed in the protocol. The purpose is to reach a consensus on which chain of blocks to maintain, in a distributed manner. Eventually, such chosen chain of blocks produces a final ledger of transactions. Under the Nakamoto protocol, a node appends the next generated block to the longest chain in its local view of the blocktree. Unlike PoW systems, Nakamoto protocol can lead to serious security issues for PoS systems as discussed above. We propose using the following s-truncated longest chain rule, introduced in [1, 10] .
At any given time slot, an honest node keeps track of one main chain that it appends its next generated block to. Upon receiving a new chain of blocks, it needs to decide which chain to keep. Instead of comparing the total number of blocks between those two chains, as in Nakamoto protocol, we compare the total number of blocks in truncated versions of those two chains (Algorithm 1 line 32). Let b fork be the block where those two chains fork. The honest node counts how many blocks are in each chain, up to s time slots after the fork, i.e. (b fork .header.time + s). The chain with more blocks within that window is chosen, and the next generated block will be appended to the newest block in that selected chain.
When s = ∞, the proposed fork choice rule recovers the Nakamoto protocol, but the stake is fixed since the genesis block. This leads to a system that is secure but not adaptive. This is undesirable, as even a coin with no current stake can participate in block generation. We propose using an appropriate global choice of s < ∞, that scales linearly with the security parameter κ. This ensures that the protocol meets the desired level of security, while adapting to dynamic stake updates. One caveat is that we only apply this s-truncation when comparing two chains that both have at least κ blocks after those two chains forked. If one of the chain has less than κ blocks after forking, we use the longest chain rule to determine which chain to mine on. This is necessary in order to ensure that s-truncation is only applied to chains with enough blocks, such that our probabilistic analysis results hold.
Content of the block. Once a node is elected a leader, all unconfirmed transactions in its buffer are added to the content (Algorithm 1 line 20). Along with the transactions, the content of the block also includes the identity of the coin that won the election, and the hash and proof from VRFprove(·). This allows other nodes to verify the accuracy of the leader election. A common source of randomness RandSource is also included, to be used in the next leader election. The state variable in the content contains the hash of parent block, which ensures that the content of the parent block cannot be altered. Finally, the header and the content is signed with the forward secure signature KES.sk n .
Note that the content of the block is added after the leader election, in order to avoid any grinding on the content. However, this allows the adversary to create multiple blocks with the same header but different content. In particular, after one leader election, the adversary can create multiple blocks appending to different parent blocks, as long as those parent blocks share the same common source of randomness. Such copies of a block with the same header but different contents are known as a "forkable string" in [14] or "non-core blocks" in [10] . We show in the next section that the Nakamoto-PoS protocol is secure against all such variations of attacks.
rmax total rounds of the system β total proportion of the adversarial stake f block arrival rate per millisecond δ slot duration ∆ round duration κ security parameter c correlation parameter s parameter in the fork choice rule φc maximum growth rate of a private tree Table 2 : The parameters used in our analysis.
Security analysis of the static stake protocol
Security of PoW systems, e.g. [11] , rely on the fact that total number of blocks generated by the adversary under a PoW system grows linearly in time. For a PoS system, the grinding attack allows the adversary to generate exponentially many blocks. However, one can hope to achieve security if the adversarial blocks added in any single chain is still growing at most linearly. We make this intuition precise in the following sections.
First, in Section 6.1, we focus on a particular private attack, where the adversary privately grows a block tree with full grinding until it is long enough to take over the public block chain. We provide a tight characterization of the growth rate of this tree, denoted by φ c , where c ∈ Z + is a parameter of our choice in c-correlation. The adversary's mining power is effectively amplified by this factor of φ c .
This analysis provides a crucial building block in providing full security analysis for any adversary, in Section 6.2. We show that the system is secure against all attacks allowed under our model in Section 4, as long as the adversary controls less than 1/(1 + 2φ c ) proportion of the stake. This includes private chain attack, grinding on the coin, and grinding on the parent block, as well as an adversary that creates multiple copies of blocks with the same header, possibly appending to different parent blocks.
Throughout this section, we assume that (i) the stake is not changing over time, (ii) we use s = ∞ in s-truncation, (iii) the slot duration is the same as the round duration, i.e. δ = ∆, and use the terms slot and round interchangeably, and (iv) f is the expected arrival rate of a block per millisecond such that f ∆r blocks are generated in r rounds on average. Note that when s = ∞, the s-truncation rule is the same as the longest chain rule proposed by Nakamoto.
Analysis of the private Nothing-at-Stake attack
We analyze a particular attack, and the analysis will be used as a fundamental building block to prove security of our protocol. Concretely, consider a private Nothing-at-Stake (NAS) attack, where an adversary grows a block tree in isolation. This private tree is hidden from the public view, until it is long enough to take over the public tree mined by the honest nodes. This is the PoS counterpart of the attack originally analyzed by Nakamoto in [17] . The success of this attack depends on whether that private tree can grow faster than the public tree or not. We analyze how much stake the adversary needs to control in order to succeed. This threshold, denoted by β c below, increases with increasing c, i.e. how long we keep the source of common randomness fixed in c-correlation. Eventually β c converges to 1/2, recovering the security of private attack under PoW.
Under the c-correlation protocol, we define (φ c , ψ c ) > 0 as the unique pair satisfying
Let F c (φ) := F c (φ, ψ) with ψ satisfying Eq. (2). The uniqueness follows from the fact that ∇ φ F c (φ) < 0 for all φ > 0 as shown in Eq. (17) . In the following theorem, we show that φ c is an upper bound on the growth rate of the private tree, with a high probability. ψ c does not have an immediate interpretation, and is an auxiliary variable that shows up in the proof of Proposition 1, provided in Section B.2. Proposition 1. Under the Nakamoto-PoS protocol with c = O(1), a private tree grown in isolation by an adversary with β fraction of the stake for r rounds starting from the genesis block has a height upper bounded by φ c βf ∆r(1 + ε) with a probability larger than 1 − e −Ω(εφcβf ∆r) . Note that βf ∆r is the expected number of blocks generated by the adversary, if mining honestly without grinding. With grinding, this is amplified by a factor of φ c . With c-correlation, this amplification factor is reduced from e when c = 1 to 1 when c = ∞.
When the private tree grows faster than the public tree, the adversary can eventually take over the entire block chain. This happens when 1 − β < βφ c , or equivalently β > 1/(1 + φ c ). We use β c := 1/(1 + φ c ) to denote this threshold on successful private NaS attack. Note that in Theorem 1, β < 1/(1 + 2φ c ) is required for security against a more powerful adversary who can also launch a hybrid of private and public attack. For any given value of c, we can numerically compute the growth rate as shown in the table above. This provides a guideline for a practitioner to choose the appropriate c-correlation, in order to achieve the desired level of security. Note that e 2.71828 is the base of the natural logarithm. For a large enough c, the growth rate converges to one. The following analysis shows that the rate of convergence is 1 + Θ( (ln c)/c). A proof is provided in Appendix B.3. To show that this convergence rate is tight, we simulated the growth of a private tree with NaS attack under the optimal adversarial strategy given in Lemma 4. In each round of our simulation, for every fixed block that is currently being mined on, its child-blocks are generated as a Poisson point process with rate 0.1, i.e., βf ∆ = 0.1. For each c, we ran the growth of the tree until the growth rate has sufficiently converged, as shown in Figure 7 . Each point is averaged over 10 independent runs. We show the simulation results for c ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256} with corresponding φ c ∈ {2.22547, 1.88255, 1.64060, 1.46780, 1.34313, 1.25244, 1.18606, 1.13725}. We plot φ c − 1 against c in a log-log plot. The red uses the numerically computed values of φ c , and the blue line is the simulation result. The gap between the red line and the blue line is due to the coarse discretization of the continuous differential equation in Eq. (10), and can be made closer with a finer discretization and a longer run-time.
Main results
We define a set of desirable properties to prove security, introduced in [11] for PoW systems. Let C k be the chain resulting from pruning a chain C up to k, by removing the last k blocks at the end of the chain. Note that C k is a prefix of C, which we denote by C k C. The k-common prefix property ensures that after pruning a longest chain, it is a prefix of all future longest chains in the local view of any honest node.
Definition 1 (k-common prefix). We say a protocol and a corresponding confirmation rule have a kcommon prefix property, if any pair of longest chains C 1 and C 2 in the view VIEW n,F Π,A,Z (κ) of any honest node n at any two rounds r 1 ≤ r 2 , respectively, satisfy C k 1
In the absence of any adversary, each node will contribute to the final ledger as many blocks as their proportion of the stake. In the presence of an adversary, the chain quality property ensures that the contribution of the adversary is bounded.
Definition 2 ((µ, )-chain quality). We say a protocol and a corresponding confirmation rule have a (µ, )chain quality property, if in the view VIEW n,F Π,A,Z (κ) of any honest node n and at any round r, the number of honest blocks in any consecutive blocks of the longest chain is at least µ .
Note that this requires chain quality to hold globally over all time. In particular, this implies other chain quality conditions used in the analyses of Ouroboros [14] and Prism [3] . The chain growth property ensures that no matter what the adversarial strategy is, the longest chain grows at a certain rate.
Definition 3 ((τ, s)-chain growth). We say a protocol and a corresponding confirmation rule have a (τ, s)chain growth property, if in the view VIEW n,F Π,A,Z (κ) of any honest node n and at any round r, n adopts a longest chain C, then it holds that after s consecutive rounds n adopts a chain that is at least τ s blocks longer than C.
When β < 1/(1 + 2φ c ), we show that these properties hold with high probability, under the following assumptions. Assumption 1. For a choice of a correlation parameter c ∈ Z + , ε > 0, and a security parameter κ > 0, the block arrival rate per slot is bounded by f ∆ ≤ ε/2, we choose the total number of rounds of the system r max = O(poly(κ)) and r max ≥ 2κ/f ∆, the proportion of the adversarially controlled stake is upper bounded by β ≤
where φ c ∈ [1, e] is the growth rate of a private tree that only depends on c and is defined in Section 6.1. 
, κ -chain quality property in Definition 2, and
2φcf ∆ -chain growth property in Definition 3, with probability at least 1 − e −Ω(ε 2 κ) .
We provide a sketch of the proof in Section 6.3 and a complete proof in Appendix B.1. Our goal is to generate a transaction ledger that satisfies persistence and liveness as defined in [11] . Together, persistence and liveness guarantees robust transaction ledger; honest transactions will be adopted to the ledger and be immutable. The formal definition of persistence and liveness and how they follow from Theorem 1 is derived in Appendix B.5.
Sketch of the proof of Theorem 1
Our analysis technique builds upon the security analysis of Bitcoin backbone protocol in [11] , with a crucial difference on how we bound the effect of the adversary on the blockchain. The analysis of Bitcoin backbone protocol relies on the concentration of the total number of blocks an adversary can generate around its mean, βf ∆r blocks in r rounds, with high probability. For a PoS system, this is no longer true. In r rounds, an adversary can efficiently generate many, e O(r) , blocks with distinct headers. If we include the multiple versions of the adversarial blocks with the same header, this number is unbounded. This requires an innovation on how to measure the effectiveness of an adversary on tampering with the consensus of PoS blockchain protocols. To this end, we propose using the number of in sequence adversarial blocks as the measure of adversarial attack as formally defined in Eq. (3). Concretely, we build upon the growth rate of the branching process modeling private NaS tree from Section 6.1 to show that the number of adversarial blocks added in a single chain in the entire block tree (including the private and public chains) in r rounds is bounded by φ c βf ∆r. This allows us to provide k-common prefix property, when β is sufficiently small.
We define a typical execution (Definition 5), and show that this event happens with a large enough probability (Corollary 1). We complete a proof of Theorem 1 in Section B.1, by showing that under the typical execution, the three desired properties hold.
The analysis crucially relies the intuition that although the corrupt nodes can generate far more blocks than honest nodes (as grinding on the common source of randomness is possible), there cannot be too many adversarial blocks in a single chain of blocks. To make this intuition rigorous, we present necessary definitions and their probabilistic analyses. For an interval S of rounds, i.e. S = [r 1 , r 2 ] = {r 1 , r 1 + 1, . . . , r 2 } for some r 1 ≤ r 2 , we define the following random variables.
-X[S] is the number of rounds in S where one or more blocks are generated by honest nodes.
-Y [S] is the number of rounds in S where exactly one block is generated by honest nodes.
Under the model defined in Section 4, each honest node n ∈ N is elected with a probability ρ × stake n /H max where [0, H max ] is the range of the pseudorandom number generated by VRF. Assuming each node controls a fraction of the stake bounded by O(1/|N |), and for a large enough network size |N |, we approximate the number of blocks generated by the honest nodes in a single slot by a Poisson process Poi(f ∆( m∈H stake m )/( m ∈N stake m )), where we define f ρ × m∈N stake m /(H max ∆) to be the block generation rate measured in blocks per milliseconds. In practice, a target f is chosen by the system designer and the ideal functionality provides the appropriate value of ρ to the nodes in each slot. Further, note that this rate of honest block generation does not depend on the adversarial strategy. The only thing that changes with the adversarial strategy is where those blocks append to. This leads to the following concentration result implying that enough unique honest blocks will be generated. We note that X[S] and Y [S] are the same for the view of the honest nodes and that of the adversarial nodes because they depend only on the actions of the honest nodes. Every node keeps a history of all blocks it sees on the blockchain. Thus every node has a view of all the blocks associated the blockchain process in public. In addition, every node has a view of blocks it mines in private. We note that at the end of each round, the views of the honest blocks synchronise (by the model we assume) and hence the honest blocks have a one unique view at the start of a round. We assume that there is a single adversary who has access to the adversarial strategy and adversarial blocks. Hence the adversarial view is also unique. Further, we note that every block in the honest view is present in the adversarial view. In addition, the adversarial view can include blocks mined by the adversary but kept in private (and hence not present in the honest view).
We define a block-tree T r as the tree of blocks that are seen on the blockchain process in the adversarial view at the end of round r.
Definition 4 (In-Sequence blocks). Given a block-tree T r at the end of round r, we define a set of blocks
Given a block tree in the adversarial view at the end of round r, T r ; let C be the longest public chain on it. For S = [r , r], an interval of rounds, define V [S] as the longest sequence of in-sequence blocks generated by the adversary during rounds in S on any chain that diverged from C at round after r in T r . More concretely, V [[r , r]] := max C ∈Tr forking from C at round after r
where Z C [S] is the number of adversarially mined blocks on a chain C in interval S in the adversarial view at some round after the largest round in S. By forking we mean that a block in the block tree has multiple successors. This may occur either due to multiple honest nodes obtaining blocks in a round or due to one or more adversarially generated blocks.
We note that all of these need not be released in rounds in S. Thus V [S] is defined based on the view of the adversary, and may not be seen by the honest nodes. We next define the notion of typical execution.
Definition 5 (Typical execution). An execution is (ε, λ)-typical for β-corrupt system, for ε ∈ (0, 1) and an integer λ, if, for a set of at least λ consecutive rounds, the following hold for any interval of rounds S of length more than λ: There are at most r 2 max choices of S, and the following corollary follows from union bound. This corollary follows from Propositions 3 and 4.
Corollary 1. The Nakamoto-PoS protocol executes with (ε, λ)-typical execution with probability at least 1 − r 2 max e −Ω(ε 2 f ∆λ) .
We will set r max ≤ poly(κ) and f ∆λ = Θ(κ), such that typical execution holds with probability at least 1 − e −Ω(ε 2 κ) . In Section B.1, we show that the desired properties hold under this typical execution.
Dynamic stake protocol
The stake is dynamically being updated via transactions included in the blockchain. If the changes in the stakes take effect immediately in the leader elections, then the system is vulnerable to an adversary grinding on the secrete key of the coin as discussed in §5. We propose using the stake at time t − s to run an election at time t. However, a long-range private attack is still possible. The proposed s-truncation scheme that generalizes Nakamoto longest chain protocol can detect such long-range attacks, and exclude them from the longest chain. It has been shown in [1] , for example, that s-truncation schemes provide security for the dynamic stake setting.
Discussion
There are several attacks that are outside the scope of the security model studied in standard secure blockchain literature [1, 2, [6] [7] [8] 12, 14, 18] . The design choices in a protocol inevitably trades off with such external attacks, but cannot be directly analyzed. This includes nodes behaving rationally according to incentives, eclipse attacks on network access, and bribing a node with external incentives. Theoretical understanding of such attacks and securing against them requires different techniques than those studied in this paper, and we believe they provide interesting new research directions.
Appendix

A Notes and Proofs for Section 2
A.1 Growth rate of NaS tree
In this section we show that the expected growth rate of the NaS tree is eβ.
The adversary grows a private tree starting with the genesis block as root at time t = 0. At any time t, the adversary independently mines on all the blocks of its private tree. From the point of view of a fixed block, its child-blocks are generated as a Poisson point process with rate β i.e., the time interval between the child-blocks is an exponential random variable with rate β. Let the depth of the tree G(t) denoted by D(t) and defined as the maximum depth of its blocks. Let the random variable X (t) denote the number of blocks at depth i and the expectation is
The genesis block is at height zero.
Let X (t, t ) = X (t) − X (t ). For very small values of δ, we have
Therefore, x +1 (t) satisfies the following differential equation
with initial conditions x (0) = 0 ∀ i. The root block satisfies
By recursively solving equation (4) and (5), we obtain
From (6) we observe that the expected number of blocks at a fixed depth , grows with time t. On the other hand, for a fixed time t, the expected number of blocks tend to zero as the depth increases; both make intutive sense. Equation (6) helps us derive the longest chain growth rate. For small > 0, let
Since X (t) is positive random variable, Markov's inequality gives us
Equality (a) follows from the fact that X u is an integer. The second equality (b) follows from equation (6). Equality (c) is obtained by substitution βt using equation (7) . Inequality (d) uses Stirling's approximation. Inequality (e) holds since 1 + 1 √ x
x > e √ x−1/2 for all x > 1.
which gives us R NAS ≤ eβ. Similar, for small > 0, let l := (1 − )eβt, then
as t → ∞, which gives us R NAS ≥ eβ and concludes the proof.
A.2 R g calculation according to [10] We recall that R g is the expected growth rate of the longest chain of the tree grown by honest nodes (adveraries are acting purely privately) using the g-greedy protocol. We also recall that R g is increasing monotonically in g and that R ∞ = e(1 − β), where e is the base of the natural logarithm. In [10] , the authors claim that R 2 = 2.1(1−β) by assuming that all chains grow with at the same steady rate as the longest chain and then investigating the average case. One can generalize their methodology for arbitrary g as follows:
suppose the length of the longest chain at round r is , let x i with 0 ≤ i ≤ g be the number of chains with length − i. For simplicity, x 0 is set to be 1. Then using the arguments in Lemma 4.6 in [10] , we obtain the following g + 1 equations with g + 1 unknowns {x i : 1 ≤ i ≤ g} and R g .
By solving these equations numerically, we obtain the value of Rg 1−β as shown in Table 4 . It turns out that R g > e(1 − β) for g ≥ 8 which is in contradiction to the fact that R g is monotonically increasing and the limiting value is R ∞ = e(1 − β). This shows that the method in [10] to estimate the growth rate of the longest chain is flawed. Table 4 : Chain growth rate for g-greedy protocol using the method of [10] . There is an inconsistency in the calculation for g ≥ 8.
A.3 Pseudo Code for the Balance Attack
In the main text we have described the balance attack informally along with accompanying examples depicted in Figure 3 . Here we provide a formal pseudocode describing the balance attack algorithm for completeness.
B Proofs for Section 6
We provide proofs of technical results.
Balance attack (g) 1: procedure Initialize( )
2:
PrivateTree1 ← genesis 3: PrivateTree2 ← genesis 4:
PublicTree1 ← genesis 5:
PublicTree2 ← genesis 6: procedure Attack( ) 7:
for r = 1 : r max do 8: HonestMining(g,PublicTree1,PublicTree2) honest nodes work on blocks in the public view under g-greedy protocol 9: AdversaryMining(PrivateTree1,PrivateTree2) adversary works privately on all blocks in the private view 10: if height(PublicTree1) == height(PublicTree2) then 11: adversary reveals nothing 12: else if height(PublicTree1) > height(PublicTree2) then 13: PublicTree2(1:height(PublicTree1)) ← PrivateTree2(1:height(PublicTree1)) 14: else if height(PublicTree1) < height(PublicTree2) then 15: PublicTree1(1:height(PublicTree2)) ← PrivateTree1(1:height(PublicTree2)) 16 :
return the length of the longest fork from genesis
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We provide proofs of each of the three properties.
Common prefix Given Corollary 1, it suffices to prove that under the (ε, λ)-typical execution, the κcommon prefix holds, where κ = 2φ c f ∆λ. Consider the discrete model where the honest users successfully generate Poi((1 − β)f ∆) blocks in a time slot and the adversary has a probability of successfully mining Poi(βf ∆).
Lemma 1. Suppose the block b at height k of a chain C was generated by an honest node in round r. Then any block at height k on any chain C at any time is either block b, one of the other blocks generated by some honest node in round r, or is generated by the adversary.
Proof. We show this by contradiction. Let B r be the set of honest blocks computed in round r, and B s be the set of honest blocks computed in round s, where s > r.
Let one of B r be the k-th block in chain C. We have that each block in B r is in the k-th position in some chain, because no honest miners would be mining at chains which were at depth k − 2.
For obtaining a contradiction assume that one of the blocks of B s is at the k-th position of some chain C .
We note that round r + 1 on-wards, all honest miners mine at position at least k in any chain. This contradicts the claim that some honest miner was mining at level k − 1 in some chain at round s ≥ r + 1, giving us the result. Remark 1. We note that the this remark implies that we have an injection between honest blocks mined in uniquely successful rounds which are not on chain C to adversarial blocks on chain C.
Similarly for a chain C, recall that Z C [S] is defined to be the number of different rounds in which adversary mines blocks on chain C. Let us focus on the block tree at round r, and the longest chain at that round r on the honest view (if there are multiple longest chains pick any one of them arbitrarily). Define the following events, with r = r − λ, where λ = κ 2φcf ∆ . 
The first condition gives us that
where we assumed f ∆ ≤ ε/2, which gives us the occurrence of eventẼ 1 . On the other hand, we have concentration of X[S] and Z C [S]. For S = [r − λ, r], we have
Lemma 3. IfẼ[r , r] occurs with r = r − λ = r − κ 2φcf ∆ , the last κ consecutive blocks of any chain C at round r are mined in at least λ consecutive rounds.
Proof. By definition we know that E 2 [r , r] ⊇Ẽ[r , r]. Event E 2 [r , r] implies that the total number of blocks of any chain C mined in interval [r , r] is less than κ. Therefore the κ-th deep block of C was mined on or before round r .
Theorem 2. IfẼ[r , r] occurs with r = r − κ 2φcf ∆ for all r, the κ-common prefix property holds.
Proof. Let C 1 be a chain which is the longest chain at current round r 1 and C 2 be a chain which is the longest chain at a future round r 2 > r 1 , which violates the common-prefix property, i.e., C κ 1 C 2 . Let r be the earliest round r 1 ≤ r ≤ r 2 such that there is a longest chain C 2 such that C κ 1 C 2 . If r = r 1 , define C 1 = C 1 ; otherwise, define C 1 to be a longest chain at round r − 1. Note that C κ 1
Observe that by our assumptions such an r is well-defined (since e.g., r 2 is such a round, albeit not necessarily the smallest one); refer to Figure 8 for an illustration. Consider the last block b * on the common prefix of C 1 and C 2 that was mined by an honest node and let r * be the round in which it was mined (if no such block exists let r * = 0). Define the set of rounds S = {i :
be the number of blocks generated in the interval S which are neither in C 1 or C 2 by honest blocks in uniquely successful rounds. Using Lemma 1, we claim that,
We note that as at least one of
However, we note that,Ẽ[r 1 − λ, r 1 ] holding gives us E 2 [r 1 − λ, r 1 ] holds, from Lemma 3, which gives us that, the κ-th deep block of the chain C 1 was mined on or before round r 1 − λ and this implies r * < r 1 − λ ≤ r − λ. Then we haveẼ 1 [r − λ, r] which gives us the a contradiction and hence the claim.
Chain quality We show this by contradiction. Let C be the longest chain of an honest node at round r and denote the i-th block of chain C as
and have the properties: (1) that the block b u was mined by an honest node or is genesis in case such block does not exist, and (2) that there exists a round at which an honest node was trying to extend the chain ending at block b v . Note that C[u , v ] is well defined since C is such a chain. Define r 1 as the round that block b u was mined (r 1 = 0 if b u is the genesis block), r 2 as the first round that an honest node attempts to extend b v .
Define the set of rounds S = {i : r 1 < i ≤ r 2 }. Let H be the number of honest blocks on chain C mined in the interval S and say H < µκ. Then the number of blocks on chain C mined by adversary in the same interval S is at least N − 1 − H, i.e., Z C [r 1 , r 2 ] ≥ N − 1 − H. By chain growth property, we have N − 1 ≥ X[r 1 , r 2 ]. Adding them up, we have
We note that,Ẽ[r 2 − λ, r 2 ] holding gives us E 2 [r 2 − λ, r 2 ] holds, from Lemma 3, which gives us that b u , was mined on or before round r 2 − λ. Since block b u was mined before block b u , we have r 1 ≤ r 2 − λ. Then under the event E 1 [r 2 − λ, r 2 ], we have
which contradicts Equation (9) 
. Therefore, in the interval S, at least µκ blocks on C[b u , b v ] were mined by honest nodes and these blocks must be in C[u, v] by definition of N .
Chain growth Since honest nodes always work on the longest chain in the unique honest view, the length of the longest chain grows by at least X[r − λ, r] in the interval [r − λ, r]. And we have
which completes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The adversary is growing a private chain over the genesis block, under the c-correlation. As illustrated in the figure below, the common source of randomness at a block is only updated when the height is a multiple of c (Algorithm 1 line:17). We refer to such a block b with height(b)%c = 0 as a godfather-block.
The randomness of a block changes only at godfather-blocks. In other words, for n ∈ Z, blocks along a chain at depths nc, nc + 1, nc + 2, · · · , nc + c − 1 share a common random number. Two blocks are called siblingsblocks if they have the same parent block. Given this shared randomness, the adversary now has a freedom to choose where to place the newly generated blocks. The next theorem provides a dominant strategy, that creates the fastest growing private tree.
Lemma 4. Under c-correlation, the optimal adversarial strategy to grow the tree fast is to only fork at the parents of godfather-blocks.
Proof. Note that under the security model, several types of grinding attacks are plausible. First, at height multiple of c, the adversary can grind on the header of the parent of the godfather block, and run an independent election at every round. Secondly, between godfather blocks, once an adversary is elected a leader, it can generate multiple blocks of the same header but appending on different blocks. However, adding multiple blocks with the same header cannot make the tree any higher than the optimal scheme. Genesis height=5 height=10 height=0 Fig. 9 : An example of T (∆) (t) with c = 5 under the optimal strategy to grow the private NaS tree. Blocks forking from the same godfather-block share the same common source of randomness, as shown by the colors. To grow the tree fast, it is optimal to grow a single chain until the next godfather block. Circles with black outlines indicate blocks that are currently mined on.
Sibling non-godfather blocks share a common random number and thus 'mining events' on these blocks are completely dependent. As a result, the longest chain originating from a particular non-godfather block b is always longer (or same length) than the longest chain originating from its younger sibling (a sibling block mined after block b). Thus mining a sibling to a non-godfather block does not increase the growth rate of the longest chain. However, sibling god-father blocks have independent random numbers and thus mining multiple such block increase the growth rate of the longest chain.
From the point of view of a fixed block that is currently being mined on, its child-blocks are generated as a Poisson point process with rate βf ∆. Let the number of blocks at height at time t ∈ {∆, 2∆, · · · } be X (t), and the expectation is x (t) = E[X (t)]. The genesis block is at heights zero. Let T (∆) (t) denote the resulting random tree, and height(T (∆) (t)) denote the height of the tree.
Note that lim ∆→0 T (∆) (t) converges to a continuous time process, where the block tree is growing with Poisson arrival rate of βf . We denote this by T (0) (t). Every block in current tree produces a child node arriving at rate βf according to a Poisson arrival process. This continuous time process dominates the discrete time process in the sense that Pr(T (∆) (t) ≥ h) ≤ Pr(T (0) (t) ≥ h) for all ∆ > 0, h > 0 and t > 0. As the growth of the height of the random tree is of our interest, we focus on the continuous time process in this section, and naturally extend the definitions of X (t) and x (t) to the continuous time counterparts.
We will first derive differential equations for x (t). Since the adversary only mines multiple godfather sibling blocks, the growth rate of blocks at level i = nc + l (for m, l ∈ Z, l < c) depends on i%c = l. In particular we have
with initial condition x nc+l = X nc+l (0) = 0 and the root block satisfying
We solve for x nc+l (t) via Laplace transform. We first transform the differential equations (10) in Laplace domain, obtain a closed form solution forx nc+l (s). After that we transform the equations back to time domain. First lets apply Laplace transform for the above system of equations (10) .
for l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c − 1} Solving the above system of equations gives uŝ
x nc (s) = β n s n+1 (1 + s/β) (c−1)n .
Let us substitute β = 1 for simplicity. We compute the inverse Laplace transform ofx nc (s) via convolution:
The equality (a) is obtained by change of variable u = tz. Our goal is to find the largest θ for which x nc (θn) decreases exponentially w.r.t n. Thus we evaluate the MGF beta(n+1,(c−1)n) (t) at t = θn: 
The summation in Equation (12) is dominated by its largest term, which is given by
where p 0 satisfies
Let φ c = c/θ and ψ c = p 0 /c, then Eq. (15) 
The fixed point pair (φ c , ψ c ) is the threshold above which the expected number of blocks at that level h = cn = tφ c at time t = cn/φ c starts to decrease exponentially. Note that we always have 1
(1), and we plug-in ψ = ψ(φ) = (c − cφ + (c − cφ) 2 + 4cφ)/2cφ satisfying Eq. (2). Next we show that the gradient of the exponent is strictly negative:
for all 0 < c < ∞ and φ > 0, where we used the fact that dψ(φ)/dφ = 0 as ψ(φ) is the maximizer of Eq. (12) . Precisely, dF c (φ, ψ)/dψ = ln((1 + cψ)/(c(1 + ψ)ψφ)). This is zero, which follows from Eq. (14) . It follows that
where we used the fact that F c (φ c ) = 0 from the definition of φ c . After re-scaling the time to take into account f ∆β blocks are generated per second (and letting nc = φ c r), we get the desired result for any c = Θ(1). If c increases, the derivative in (17) approaches zero. A tighter analysis in this asymptotic regime is provided in Proposition 2 and in Section B.3.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let φ c = 1 + ε c , and suppose ε c = o c (1) and ψ c = o c (1) as c grows. From Eq. (1), Taylor expansion gives
From Eq. (2), we know that ψ c = O(max{1/(cε c ), √ c}). Hence, in order for the dominating terms to cancel, we need (1/2)ε 2 c > (1/c) ln(1+cφ c ). When ε = (ln c)/c+o( (ln c)/c) and the corresponding ψ c = O(1/ √ c), then this can be satisfied for large enough c. In this case, we get that F c (φ c , ψ c ) = −Ω( √ ln c/c).
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the block-tree at any round in operation. Note that this block tree depends upon both the honest operating protocol which we have defined above and adversarial strategy, which can be arbitrary. Let T r be a block tree defined according to the PoS protocol conditioned on the adversarial strategy. Let C be a longest chain on T r .
Define Ar = {C ∈ T r |C diverged from C at roundr}
We note that in rounds [r, r], by Lemma 1, the growth of chains in Ar would be at most φ c βf ∆(r−r)(1+ 1 ) with probability at least 1 − e − 1φc βf ∆(r−r) if it were just an adversarial process. However, considering the presence of honest nodes, we have that in rounds [r, r], there are at most 100(1 − β)f ∆(r −r) ≤ 100(r −r) honest blocks generated with probability at least 1−e −100(1−β)∆f (r−r) by Chernoff bound for Poisson random variable.
Let B 0 be the last block mined by honest nodes in rounds [r, r], which is at height k 0 and mined at round r 0 . By definition, all descendant blocks of B 0 are mined by adversarial nodes. If we contract the edge between B 0 and its parent block and move block B 0 right under the genesis block, then V [r, r] will not decrease and adversarial nodes can mine more blocks in rounds [r, r 0 ]. Repeat this operation for all honest nodes mined in rounds [r, r], we have that V [r, r] is upper bounded by the scenario where all 100(r −r) honest blocks are right under the genesis block although this scenario violates rules for honest nodes.
Hence we have that the probability of a chain in Ar having added more than φ c βf ∆(r −r)(1 + 1 ) in-sequence adversarial blocks in [r, r] is at most 100(r −r)e − 1φc βf ∆(r−r) + e −100(1−β)∆f (r−r) for any 1 > 0. In other words, with probability, 1-(r −r)e −Ω( 1φc βf ∆(r−r)) , we have that V [r, r] ≤ φ c βf ∆(r −r)(1 + 1 ) for a givenr.
Next we compute the probability that for allr < r − k 2φcf ∆ , V [r, r] ≤ φ c βf ∆(r −r)(1 + 1 ). We do this by a union bound noting that, the probability of failure is upper bounded by 
B.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Definition 6 (from [11] ). A protocol Π maintains a robust public transaction ledger if it organizes the ledger as a blockchain of transactions and it satisfies the following two properties:
-(Persistence) Parameterized by κ ∈ N, if in a certain round a transaction tx appears in a block which is more than κ blocks away from the end of the main chain of an honest node (such transaction will be called confirmed), then tx will be confirmed by all honest nodes in the same position in the ledger. -(Liveness) Parameterized by u, κ ∈ N, if a transaction tx is received by all honest nodes for more than u rounds, then all honest nodes will report tx at least κ blocks away from the end of the ledger, i.e., tx will be confirmed by all honest nodes.
The main result is that common prefix, chain quality, and chain growth imply that the transaction ledger satisfies persistence and liveness. Proof. We first prove Persistence. The proof is essentially based on the common prefix property of Nakamoto-PoS protocol.
Lemma 5 (Persistence). The public transaction ledger maintained by Nakamoto-PoS satisfies Persistence parameterized by κ with probability at least 1 − e −Ω(ε 2 κ) .
Proof. Let C 1 be the main chain of an honest node P 1 at round r 1 . Suppose a transaction tx is contained in C κ 1 at round r 1 , i.e., it is confirmed by P 1 . Consider a main chain C 2 of an honest node P 2 at a round r 2 ≥ r 1 . By the common prefix property, C κ 1 C 2 , which completes the proof. We next prove Liveness, which is based on the chain quality and chain growth property of Nakamoto-PoS protocol.
Lemma 6 (Liveness). The public transaction ledger maintained by Nakamoto-PoS satisfies Livenesss parameterized by u = 2κ (1−β)(1−2ε)f ∆ and κ with probability at least 1 − e −Ω(ε 2 κ) .
Proof. We prove that after a transaction tx is received by all honest nodes for at least u rounds, then there exists an honest node with chain C such that C is the longest chain and tx is included in C κ . By chain growth property, the length of the main chain of any honest node has increased by at least 2κ blocks in consecutive u rounds.
Then the chain quality property implies that at least one of the blocks in the κ suffix of C κ was mined by an honest node. Such a block would contain tx since all honest nodes have received tx as an unconfirmed transaction at that time. Thus, the lemma follows.
C Verifiable Random Functions
Definition 7 (from [9] ). A function family F (·) (·) : {0, 1} a(κ) → {0, 1} b(κ) is a family of VRFs is there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Gen and deterministic algorithms VRFprove and VR-Fverify such that Gen(1 κ ) outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk); VRFprove(x, sk) computes (F sk (x), π sk (x)), where π sk (x) is the proof of correctness; and VRFverify(x, y, π, pk) verifies that y = F sk (x) using the proof π. Formally, we require 1. Uniqueness: no values (pk, x, y 1 , y 2 , π 1 , π 2 ) can satisfy VRFverify(x, y 1 , π 1 , pk) =VRFverify(x, y 2 , π 2 , pk) when y 1 = y 2 . 2. Provability: if (y, π) =VRFprove(x, sk), then VRFverify(x, y, π, sk) = 1. This ensures that the output of a VRF is computationally indistinguishable from a random number even if the public key pk and the function VRFprove is revealed.
D Nakamoto-PoS protocol pseudocode
